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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WYCOFF COMPANY, INCORPOR-
ATED 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH AND ROY HILL djb/a 
SEMIONS TRUCK LINE 
Defendants. 
Cases No. 
7409 and 7410 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASES 
These matters are before the Supreme Court on 
writs of review from the Public Service Commission of 
Utah for the purpose of reviewing three reports 1and 
orders of the Commission issued under the date of 
August 8, 1949, following a consolidated hearing of the 
Commission's Cases No. 3273, No. 3409 and No. 3413, 
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held at Salt Lake City, Utah on June 29, 1949. Case 
No. 3273 involved the application of Roy Hill dba Sea-
mons Truck Line (the defendant) for a certificate of 
convenience and necessity as a common motor carrier 
of property over regular routes. Cases No. 3409 and 
3413 dealt with the applications of Wycoff Company, 
Incorporated (the plaintiff), (1) for a permit to operate 
as 1a contract motor carrier of property, and (2) for 
a certificate of convenience and necessity as a common 
motor carrier of property over regular routes respeC-
tively. The applicants applied only for intrastate rights 
principally to transport motion picture film, theater 
supplies and accessories, and newspapers to points north 
of Salt Lake City. 
The Commission granted the application of the 
defendant, Hill, and denied both applications of the 
plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated. A petition 
for rehearing was filed in each case on August 13, 1949. 
Two of them were denied September 20, 1949 and the 
third, which involved the plaintiff's application for 
common motor carrier authority, was denied October 13, 
1949. The petitions for rehearing were all filed by this 
plaintiff and alleged as error all matters which are 
before this Court for review. 
Case No. 7 409 now before the Supreme Court deals 
with the contract motor carrier application (the Com-
mission's Case No. 3409), and the record of this case is 
hereinafter referred to as '' R' '. Supreme Court No. 
7410 contains two volumes of record and involves the 
two common motor carrier applications, first of defend-
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ant (the Commission's Case No. 3273, which record 
hereinafter referred to as '"Rec. II."), and second, of 
plaintiff, "~ycoff Company, Incorporated (the Commis-
sion's Case No. 3413, which record is hereinafter desig-
nated as "Rec. I."). 
The general issues before this Court are the follow-
ing: (1) whether the Commission regularly pursued 
its authority; (2) whether there was substantial evidence 
to support the reports and orders of the Commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 4, 1939 the Public Service Commission 
granted Northwestern Express, Inc. Contract Motor 
Carrier Permit No. 241 in Case No. 2308 which author-
ized hauling of motion picture film and related materials 
from Salt Lake City to the two theaters at Tremonton 
and the one at Garland (both in Utah), ·and return. The 
three contractees under this permit were Orpheum 
Theater of Tremonton (C. J. Shultz), Liberty Theater 
also of Tremonton (B. F. Winzler), and Garland 
Theater at Garland (G. R. Lawrence). 
Northwestern Express, Inc., a Utah corporation has 
had continuous corporate existence since 1939. By the 
sole amendment to its articles of incorporation, the 
name of the corporation was changed to Wycoff Com-
pany, Incorporated in December, 1947 (Rec. I, 159), and 
the change of name was the only purpose of the amend-
ment. 
This Contract Motor Oarrier Permit No. 241 (as 
well as its Utah Interstate Carrier Permit No. 146) 
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was ordered suspended on January 27, 1944 by the Com-
mission due to difficulties incident to wartime regula-
tions of the Office of Defense Transportation (Rec. I, 
120). 
The present principal stockholder of Wycoff Com-
pany, Incorporated, purchased the ()Utstanding stock 
of Northwestern Express, Inc. in March, 1947 when all 
of its operating rights referred to were under the sus-
pension order. In April, 1947, Northwestern Express, 
Inc. petitioned the Commission to reinstate its operat-
ing authority, and on April 24, 1947 the Commission 
ordered the previous suspension order cancelled and 
reinstated the operating rights under Permit No. 241 
and Interstate Carrier Permit No. 146. (The latter 
authorized common carrier service in interstate com-
merce between Salt Lake City and the Utah-Idaho state 
line.) The order reinstating Permit No. 241 read, in 
part, as follows: 
''The Northwestern Express is hereby author-
ized to operate upon and over the highways of 
the State of Utah in intrastate commerce over 
the same routes and under the same restrictions 
as specified in the Commission's Report and 
Order dated October 4, 1939." (Rec. I, 163). 
The caption of the reinstatement order in the Commis-
sion's Case No. 2308 contained the individual names of 
the three contractees, but the body of the order made 
no reference to the individual contractees who signed 
the contracts under the permit for the three theaters. 
Pursuant to the reinstatement order, the North-
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western Express, Inc. secured a new contract with the 
Orpheum Theater of Tremonton which was signed by 
D. "\Y. Harris, its new manager. This contract was dated 
April 7, 1947 and was filed with the Commission May 
16, 1947. (Rec. I, 119). 
On ~larch 21, 1947, the defendant Hill had made 
application to the Commission to serve the Orpheum 
and Liberty Theaters at Tremonton, and the hearing 
on the application was conducted April 16, 1947. No 
other contract carrier had been granted a contract motor 
carrier permit to serve these theaters since the Sus-
pension Order of January 27, 1944. The defendant Hill 
did secure temporary emergency permits to serve the 
two theaters pending its hearing, the first having been 
obtained March 24, 1947 (Rec. I, 76). The principal stock-
holder of the plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated, 
formerly known as Northwestern Express, Inc. testified 
that he had no personal knowledge of the hearing on 
defendant Hill's ,application held April 16, 1947, and 
none was directed to the corporation. (Rec. I, 121). By 
its report and order dated July 9, 1947, the Commission 
authorized defendant Hill to serve the Orpheum Theater 
of Tremonton (D. W. Harris), and the Liberty Theater 
of Tremonton (Dorian Toland). The same theater build-
ings were involved and the identical commodities were 
to be transported over the s~ame highways, but the 
theaters had changed ownership since Permit No. 241 
was first issued in 1939 to the plaintiff, but this change 
had occurred prior to the reinstatement of Permit No. 
241. 
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The defendant Hill made further application to the 
Commission to serve the only theater at Garland, now 
called the M~ain instead of the Garland Theater, and was 
also under different ownership from the individuals 
who signed the contracts filed under plaintiff's Permit 
No. 241. Again the plaintiff company was not given 
notice of the hearing. The Commission's Report and 
Order of January 9, 1948 authorized service by the de-
fendant Hill to the Main Theater of Garland (Reed D. 
Wood). 
All of the operating rights of defendant Hill, prior 
to the Commission's Report and Order of August 8, 
1949 (one of the orders now before this Court for re-
view), were held in the name of Melva H. Seamons. 
She received Contract Carrier Permit No. 266 by the 
Commission's Order of January 31, 1941, by which 
order the rights of her former husband, Ray T. Seamons, 
were transferred to her and his Contract Carrier Per-
mit No. 29 was cancelled. On April 15, 1947 the Com-
mission approved a lease arrangement between Melva 
H. Seamons, lessor, and Roy Hill, lessee, wherein the 
contract carrier rights of the lessor in Utah, Idaho and 
interstate commerce, were leased to the lessee. This 
lease was for five years' duration, subject to termina-
tion on 30 days' advance written notice (Rec. I, 88), and 
was to expire February 1, 1951. (Rec. I, 82). No men-
tion is made therein of any rights other than those as 
a contract motor carrier. All contracts then existing, 
or future, were to be made by mutual agreement of the 
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lessor and lessee, ·and were to be in the name of the 
lessor (~Irs. Seamons) only. 
On ~lay 21, 1948 the defendant Hill made applica-
tion in his own name for common motor carrier authority 
from Salt Lake City to .Lewiston and Garland, serving 
all the theaters covered by the Utah contract carrier 
permit that was leased from Melva H. Seamons, includ-
ing various off-route points. (Rec. II, 1). By this appli-
cation the defendant sought to change his operation as 
lessee of Contract ~Iotor Carrier Permit No. 266 to 
common motor carrier authority. The plaintiff, Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated was a protestant at the hearing 
held June 29, 1949 before the Commission, which also 
heard two applications of the plaintiff. All three appli-
cations were consolidated for purposes of the hearing 
by express consent of all concerned (Rec. I, 35). 
On August 8, 1949 the Commission issued its report 
and order concerning the defendant's application and 
thereby granted the defendant Hill, in his own right, 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 87 4 ( Rec. 
II, 14 to 18) which enlarged his operating rights to the 
same territory he formerly operated only as a lessee 
of Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 266, issued to 
Melva H. Seamons, which was cancelled by the order. 
The report and order of the Commission makes no 
reference to Melva H. Seamons or the lease arrange-
ment under which defendant Hill operated. 
Wycoff Company, Incorporated filed its application 
for a permit to operate as a contract motor carrier to 
serve the Orpheum Theater at Tremonton and the Main 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Theater ~at Garland on May 25, 1949 (R. 1 to 3). These 
two theaters were under the management of Allied 
Theatres Company. This application was filed only 
after the Commission advised the plaintiff, Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated that it had no authority to 
serve any the,aters in either Tremonton or Garland, and 
that any service rendered to that area would be in 
violation of the Commission's orders. A contract had 
been secured by the Wycoff Company, Incorporated with 
Allied Theatres Company, operators of Orpheum 
Theater ~at Tremonton and the Main Theater at Garland 
(Hugo Jorgenson) which was dated May 1, 1949 and 
was filed May 6, 1949 (R. 14, 15). A contract dated 
June 24, 1949 (five days b~fore the hearing) between 
defendant Hill and the Orpheum Theater at Tremonton 
and Main Theater ~at Garland (Allied Theatres Com-
pany, by Hugo Jorgenson) was brought into the hear-
ing but was never approved by the Commission, nor 
was an application for authority in addition to the con-
tract itself filed by defendant Hill (Rec. I, 51, 52; 165). 
On June 13, 1949, Wycoff Company, Incorporated 
made application for authority to serve as a common 
motor carrier over regular routes from Salt Lake City to 
the Utah-Idaho line over U.S. Highways 91 and 89, serv-
ing the off-route points of Lewiston and Hyrum (Rec. I, 
1). Thi:s application did not duplicate the area to be served 
by the plaintiff's contract motor carrier application. 
Since the reinstatement of Northwestern Express, 
Inc.'s interstate operating rights in 1947 and subsequent 
additions thereto, that corporation has operated daily 
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schedules, seYen days a week over the highways in 
Utah through the areas involved by its applications, 
transporting the identical commodities to points in Idaho 
under authority from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and the Public Utilities Commission of Idaho. 
Common motor carrier authority was also held in the 
plaintiff company's name from the Utah Commission to 
transport ice cream and newspapers in intrastate com-
merce over these same highways and through Tremonton 
and Garland (Rec. I, 140-1). For this reason there 
can be no question that the highways over which the 
Wycoff Company, Incorporated desires to operate are 
not unduly burdened and that the granting of the appli-
cation will not unduly interfere with the traveling public. 
Wycoff Company, Incorporated operates five daily 
schedules going north, four of which are bound for 
points in Idaho, leaving Salt Lake City as follows: 
1. Leaves at 12 :15 o'clock A.M. via Tremonton 
to Burley, Idaho; 
2. Leaves at 11:30 o'clock A.M. via Tremonton 
and Pocatello to St. Anthony, Idaho; 
3. Leaves at 1:30 o'clock P.M. via Brigham City 
and Logan, Utah to Preston, Idaho; 
4. Leaves at about midnight via Tremonton and 
Pocatello to St. Anthony, Idaho; 
5. Leaves at 2:30 o'clock P.M. to Ogden, Utah. 
(Rec. I, 111). 
Defendant Hill operates one schedule daily of two 
trucks going north from Salt Lake City, both leaving at 
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approximately 2:00 o'clock A.M. (Rec. I, 74). 
Insofar as it could be considered pertinent to a 
need for a change of service from a contract carrier to 
a common carrier by defendant Hill, the following evi-
dence or lack of evidence is pointed out: 
Only one public witness appeared in the proceed-
ings, and he appeared to support the applications of 
plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated to serve the 
Tremonton-Garland area, and to serve as a carrier in 
emergencies when the defendant Hill could not provide 
the needed service due to his limited one-schedule-a-day 
operation. 
(Testimony of defendant Hill, on cross-examina-
tion): 
"Q. Now, what is the need of a common 
carrier authority up there (in the are;;t covered 
by your application)~ 
''A. Oh, you don't have to bother with these 
contracts. It keeps somebody else from coming 
in without your being called into a hearing, j-qst 
a hearing without us knowing anything about it. 
That is about all. 
'' Q. _ Is there any need for the public, so far 
as they are concerned, for a common carrier 
authority~ 
''A. No. I wouldn't say that there was. 
''COMMISSIONER HACKING: Well, the 
fact of the business is, according to his evidence, 
all the public is using his contracts. 
"MR. HANSON (Attorney for Hill): In fact, 
he is a common carrier now, but he doesn't have 
the rights." (Rec. I, 70, 71) 
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Mr. McMahon, the public witness, is manager of 
Republic Pictures in Salt Lake City, which is one of the 
dozen film distributing companies which serve the 
theaters in Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada. 
He testified on behalf of plaintiff that all of the other 
film distributing companies operate on 'Substantially the 
same basis as his company, and that he had worked for 
three of them. His testimony was that there was no 
speedy service readily available to Tremonton and Gar-
land (Rec. I, 131), and to Logan (Rec. I, 125) except 
by the defendant Hill who operated only once :each day. 
He stated that no other carrier is authorized by the 
Commission to render the personalized, specialized, 
speedy -service the industry requires into that area. (Rec. 
I, 126; 131 ; also see 167). 
(Testimony of Mr. McMahon, direct examination): 
'' Q. Are you here to support the application 
of Wycoff Company~ 
''A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And do you feel that an additional car-
rier is to the advantage of the industry~ 
''A. I do, because I have explained before 
it is necessary to get the (motion picture) print 
there. 
'' Q. Have you used the services of Wycoff 
in the state otherwise 
''A. Yes. We used him when he started down 
to Price and Helper. 
"Q. Is this 'Service now satisfactory 
"A. Very satisfactory. I believe every ex-
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change manager and booker will say it is satis-
factory." (Rec. I, 131, 132) 
'' Q. Now, will you state whether or not one 
service a day leaving Salt Lake at approximately 
2 :00 A.M. is adequate for your business~ 
''A. Well, it depends - I mean, emergencies 
come up, and that is something we can't foresee. 
'' Q. Do you need an extra service to take 
care of these emergencies~ 
''A. I think something adequate should be 
set up for that. * * * '' (Rec. I, 127) 
The Court should be advised that there is not a 
single word from a public witness showing any need 
for a change from contract earrier to common carrier 
service. There is not even any evidence from the de-
fendant-applicant Hill himself showing any necessity 
for common carrier service. The evidence is undisputed 
that the theaters in the communities of Tremonton and 
Garland desire to be served by a contract carrier, and 
no evidence of ~any kind was presented to show the need 
for the defendant to change his type of service. The 
defendant Hill himself even had the owner of theaters 
in these communities sign on a contract to obtain con-
tract carrier service five days before the date of the 
hearing. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A. Plaintiff's ·Contract Motor Carrier Application 
1. The Commission did not regularly pursue its 
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:mthority but acted contrary to statute by denying the 
plaintiff pern1ission to serve the two theaters involved. 
2. The Commission did not regularly pursue its 
!l.uthority but acted arbitrarily or capriciously by deny-
rng the plaintiff permission to serve the two theaters 
involved. 
3. The Commission did not regularly pursue its 
authority but acted contrary to its own rules and regu-
lations by denying the plaintiff permission to serve the 
two theaters involved. 
B. Defendant's Common Motor Carrier Application 
4. The Commission did not regularly pursue its 
authority but acted without statutory authority in grant-
ing unlimited common carrier rights to the lessee of a 
contract carrier permit. 
5. There is no competent evidence to sustain the 
finding that public convenience and necessity require 
that the defendant's truck line be authorized to operate 
as a common motor carrier. 
C. Plaintiff's Common Motor Carri·er Application 
6. The finding of the Commission that public con-
venience and necessity does not require the service pro-
posed to be rendered by the plaintiff is not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
7. The findings of the Commission that there is 
already sufficient service available and that the granting 
of a certificate to plaintiff would be detrimental to 
existing transportation service ·and contrary to the best 
interests of the people in the area, are not supported 
by substantial evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff's Contract Motor Carrier Application 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED CON-
TRARY TO STATUTE BY DENYING THE PLAIN-
TIFF PERMISSION TO SERVE THE TWO THE-
ATERS INVOLVED. 
The plaintiff, Wycoff Company, Incorporated, -con-
tends that after the Commission granted it a statutory 
contract motor carrier permit which has never been 
revoked, or cancelled, that the benefits contemplated by 
the legislature under the permit were withheld by the 
Commission. 
The legislature has never defined the term "con-
tract motor carrier permit'' although it is used several 
times in Title 76, Chapter 5, U.C.A. 1943 as amended. 
It is clear that it shall be unlawful for any contract 
carrier to operate in either interstate or intrastate com-
merce witho-q.t having first obtained this "permit" after 
proper application has been made and certain facts 
determined. (76-5-21, 76-5-22, U.C.A. 1943, as amended). 
It is also ~apparent that the Commission is given certain 
powers to "suspend, alter, amend or revoke any * * * 
permit * * * issued" (76-5-33, U.C.A. 1943). 
Without question a "permit" is a thing of value, 
for under 76-5-40, U.C.A. 1943, the legislature provided 
that upon the death of a holder it "shall be transfer-
able the same as any other right or interest of the per-
son's estate,'' subject to enumerated conditions. 
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The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as amended, 
is more specific than the Utah enactn1ent in specifying 
the nature of a contract motor carrier permit and the 
rights it confers : 
''The (Interstate Commerce) Commission 
shall specify in the permit the business of the 
contract carrier covered thereby and the scope 
thereof and shall attach thereafter, such reason-
able terms, conditions, and limitations consistent 
·with the character of the holder as a contract 
carrier as are necessary to carry out, with re- . 
spect to the operations of such carrier, the re-
quirements established by the Commission * * *: 
Provided, h01cever, That no terms, conditions, or 
limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier 
to substitute or add contracts within the scope of 
the permit, as the development of the business 
and the demands of the public may require.'' ( 49 
u.s.c. 309 (b)). 
It is apparent that the federal statute clearly states 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission shall not re-
strict the freedom to contract of the holder of a permit 
by limiting to a specific shipper the authority granted 
under said permit. 
The plaintiff contends that the Utah Motor Carrier 
Act, grants to the holder of a "permit", by implication, 
some of the same rights clearly specified in detail under 
the federal act. One of these rights is for the holder of 
a "permit" to serve the new management of any of 
the industries authorized to be served by its ''permit'' 
when there is no other change in the transportation serv-
ice - i.e., when the same commodities are to be shipped 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
over the same highways between the same points of 
origin ~and destination, but instead of going to, say, the 
Orpheum Theater at Tremonton, with C. J. Shultz as 
manager or owner, they are directed to the same Or-
pheum Theater at Tremonton with D. W. Harris or 
Allied Theatres Company as owner. (See statement of 
facts). 
The Commission, by its actions, has taken the posi-
tion that nothing was reinstated by its Reinstatement 
Order of April 24, 1947, which reactivated Plaintiff's 
Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 241. It has never 
permitted the plaintiff to serve anyone under this per-
mit although Wycoff Company, Incorporated, (formerly 
named Northwestern Express, Inc.) has secured several 
contracts with the part,ies who currently managed or 
owned the theaters which were covered by the original 
contracts filed in 1939 under Permit No. 241. These 
new contracts covered the identical commodities to be 
shipped over the same highways and routes, with the 
same physical, geographic location (i.e., the same theater 
buildings) for a destination, and were signed by the 
theater management currently in existence ~after Permit 
No. 241 was reinstated. 
The Commission has taken the position that the 
parties who signed the original contracts in 1939 under 
Permit No. 241 were the only parties authorized to be 
served thereunder, and that in order for the plaintiff 
to serve the new owners it would have to proceed as in 
the first inst,ance for a new permit with a complete new 
hearing of evidence. 
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It should be borne in mind that Permit No. 241 was 
not reinstated without knowledge that the management 
of these theaters had changed. Still the Commission 
recognized its duty to reinstate the plaintiff's permit, 
but after the reinstatement rendered it valueless by 
limiting its use to individuals who no longer existed. 
Contract Motor Carrier Permit No. 241 has never 
been revoked by the Commission and the plaintiff has 
tried every method it knows to utilize it without violat-
ing instructions from the Commission, and now Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated, asks this Court to determine 
what its rights are under it. The plaintiff contends that 
the ''permit'' referred to in the statute is broader than 
the persons named as contractees (i.e., the particular 
manager or owner of a business - here, theaters). 
This is because the power of the Commission does not 
include the power to regulate a contract carrier to this 
degree. The interest of the public, for whom the Com-
mission acts in regulating contract carriers, is not to 
control with whom they may contract but to guard 
against ''unduly burdening'' the highways; to see that 
there is not "undue interference" with the traveling 
public, and to protect the best interests of the general 
public in the state ~as a whole, and in the local communi-
ties to be served (76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943, as amended by 
the laws of Utah, 1943, Chap. 105.) (Also compare the 
nature of the findings the Commission is to make as 
conditions precedent to granting an interstate "permit" 
and a tempor.ary ''permit'' which are similar to those 
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required for an intrastate "permit" - 76-5-22 and 
76-5-23.) 
In determining the nature of a ''permit'', it is to 
be remembered that the legislature has drawn a dis-
tinction between the amount of regulation to which a 
contract motor carrier, which operates under a "per-
mit," and a common carrier, which must secure a certif-
icate of convenience and necessity, are to be subjected. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in McCarthy v. Public Service Com-
mission, (Utah Supreme Court, August 25, 1947), 184 
P. 2d 220, 227, treats this matter very clearly: 
''Although the legislature gave the commis-
sion power to control contract motor carriers it 
did not require the commission to exercise the 
close control over contract carriers as it must 
exercise over common carriers. For example, as 
to common motor carriers the commission 'is 
vested with power and authority, and it shall be 
its duty, to supervise and regulate all common 
motor carriers and fix, alter, regulate and deter-
mine just, fair, reasonable and sufficient rates, 
fares, charges, etc.' (Italics added) Sec. 76-5-17. 
''However, as to contract motor carriers, 
while they must obtain a permit, the legislature 
said: 'The commission is hereby vested with 
power and authority and it may supervise and 
regulate every contract motor carrier in this 
state and fix and approve reasonable maximum 
or minimum rates, fares, charges and classifica-
tions, and to adopt reasonable rules and regula-
tions pertaining to all such motor carriers' 
(Italics added) Sec. 76-5-24, U.C.A., 1943." 
(Italics by the Court) 
The opinion continues by pointing out that this discre-
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tionary power of the Commission exists to regulate 
contract motor carrier~ -
'· * * to ~practically the same extrnt as is au-
thorized for common motor carriers - provided 
the commission determines that such close con-
trol is reasonably required. However, merely be-
cause the power and authority to regulate con-
tract n1otor carriers is given, that power and 
authority need not be exercised unless required 
for the benefit of the public and then only to the 
extent required" (Ibid, 227). 
The plaintiff knows of no determination having 
been made in this case why such regulation is required 
for the benefit of the public, and states that this Court 
has held the Commission does not have power to change 
a contract carrier into a common carrier even when 
the contract carrier makes application for the change 
without substantial evidence to show a public need for 
the change (McCarthy v. Public Service Commission, 
184 P. 2d 220; also see Point V of this brief, infra.) 
The most appare~t distinction between the rights 
conferred upon a common motor carrier under a certi-
ficate of convenience and necessity and a contract motor 
carrier under a permit is this : in the former the public 
chooses the carrier, while in contract carrier sevice, the 
carrier reserves the right to choose whom of the public 
it will serve. The statutory definitions are as follows 
(76-5-13, U.C.A. 1943): 
'' 'Common Motor Carrier of Property' means 
any person who holds himself out to the public 
as willing to undertake for hire to transport by 
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motor vehicle from place to place, the property 
of others who. may choose to employ him. 
* * * 
" 'Contract Motor Carrier of Property' means 
any person engaged in the transportation by 
motor vehicle of property for hire and not in-
cluded in the term common motor carrier of 
property as hereinbefore defined.'' 
The plaintiff had the right under its statutory per-
mit to choose to serve the new owners of the theatres 
involved. By denying plaintiff this right the Commis-
sion did not recognize the statutory rights it bestowed 
upon the plaintiff under Permit No. 241. 
Even if the Commission could conceivably be said 
to have had power to rule that plaintiff could not serve 
the new theatre owners from whom it secured valid con-
tracts, such power must be used, in the language of 
76-5-24, U.C.A. 1943, "to adopt reasonable rules and 
regulations pertaining to ,all such motor carriers.'' In 
this event the statute was still violated in that it was 
not reasonable to reinstate Permit No. 241 to the plain-
tiff and then arbitrarily withhold any possible benefits· 
it might afford. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED ARBI-
TRARY OR CAPRICIOUSLY BY DENYING THE 
PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO SERVE THE TWO 
THEATRES INVOLVED. 
If the actions of the Commission which are described 
immediately above under ''Point I'' of this brief are 
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not in violation of existing statutes, it is contended 
that such actions at least were arbitrary or capricious. 
The issuance of an order which reinstated the plain-
tiff's suspended Permit No. 241 followed by refusal of 
the Commission to allow the plaintiff to utilize the 
permit in any manner, was arbitrary or capricious. 
If the Commission intended to deprive the plaintiff of 
Permit No. :2-!1 it could have done so in accordance with 
76-5-33, U.C.A. 1943 which sets down the procedure for 
such action : 
"The Commission may at any time for good 
cause, and after notice and hearing, suspend, 
alter, amend or revoke any certificate, permit or 
license issued by it hereunder." 
There are other instances of arbitrary or capricious 
action. 
Mter the plaintiff's Permit No. 241 was reinstated 
in April, 1947, the Commission indicated that no oper-
ating rights were conferred upon the plaintiff Wycoff 
Company, Incorporated (formerly known as North-
western Express, Inc.) because the contracts filed under 
the permit were signed by owners who no longer oper-
ated the three theaters in Tremonton and Garland. 
However, some of the findings of the Commission re-
garding the application of the defendant Hill which is 
before the Court read as follows: 
"That for some time past, applicant (Hill) 
has been operating under contract carrier permit 
No. 266 and all supplements thereto, transport-
ing motion picture films, theatre accessories, 
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magazines and periodicals, from Salt Lake City 
to Lewiston ·and Garland, Utah over U. S. 91, 
Utah 101, Utah 163, Utah 61, U.S. 191 and U.S. 
30-S serving the theatres of the various towns 
enroute from Salt Lake City to Lewiston and 
Garland, Utah. 
''That the Seamons Truck Line has been con-
ducting continuous and satisfactory service as 
a contract carrier under the jurisdiction of this 
Commission, for the past 10 or 12 years. (Italics 
ours.) (Rec. II., 15). 
There is only one theatre in Garland, and the Com-
mission, by its report and subsequent order which 
granted defendant Hill's application, recognized either 
the contract of the defendant with the old management 
of the Main Theater at Garland (Reed D. Wood) at a 
time when its ownership had changed to Allied Theatres 
Company, a corporation, or it recognized the new con-
tract secured by the defendant only five days before the 
hearing of defendant Hill's application for common 
motor carrier rights, which contract was not covered 
by the defendant's permit any more than was plaintiff's 
contract (according to the contention of the Commis-
sion), with the new mai,tagement of the Orpheum Thea-
ter of Tremonton (D. W. Harris) which was filed within 
one month of the Reinstatement Order of April 24, 
1947. Nor was the latter contract of the defendant be-
fore the Commission on a Contract Motor Carrier ap-
plication. 
The Commission does not regularly pursue its au-
thority when it treats one earrier in one manner, and 
another in contrary fashion when the fact situations 
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are the same. It apparently recognized that the defend-
ant Hill's operation under a contract with a non-owner 
was not illegal but refused the plaintiff the right to 
conduct such an operation. 
III. 
THE CO:Jl~liSSIO~ DID NOT REGULARLY 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED CON-
TRARY TO ITS 0\YX RULES AND REGULATIONS 
BY DENYING THE PLAINTIFF PERMISSION TO 
SERVE THE T\YO THEATRES INVOLVED. 
Rule :No. VII of the Commission's Motor Carrier 
Rules and Regulations No. 3, (effective since June 1, 
1937) states the only promulgated regulations regarding 
filing of contracts by contract carriers of property: 
''Each contract carrier of property by motor 
vehicle subject to the Act, namely, 
"1. Carriers of general commodities * • • 
'' 4. Carriers of moving picture films, acces-
sories and theatre s_upplies ; 
"5. * * * 
shall on or before July 1, 1937, file 
with the Commission one copy of each and every 
contract existing and in force on said date * * *, 
and that the contracts so filed by any such con-
tract carrier shall be in lieu of any schedule or 
schedules theretofore filed by such contract car-
rier, and the filing of such contracts shall cancel 
any such schedule or schedules. 
"A copy of each and every contract of any 
such contract carrier, entered into or effective 
on or after July 1, 1937, shall be filed with the 
Commission in the same manner as required in 
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relation to existing contracts in the form and 
manner prescribed in Tariff Rule VI (which 
deals with filing Common Oarrier Freight Tar-
iffs) * * * so far as the provisions of said Rule 
is applicable. 
"* * ... 
"Contracts filed on or before July 1, 1937 
shall become effective when filed with the Com-
mission: contracts reducing charges specified in 
prior contracts and filed subsequent to July 1, 
1937, shall provide thirty days' notice of their 
effective date unless otherwise authorized by the 
Commission ; and contracts renewing or establish-
ing increases in charges specified in prior con-
tracts, or establishing charges for new services, 
may become effective when filed." (Italics ours). 
Every contract secured by the plaintiff after Con-
tract Carrier Permit No. 241 was reinstated by the 
Commission was filed in the manner contemplated by 
the above. These regulations were in effect at all times 
mentioned herein. There is nothing contained therein 
that would require the plaintiff to make application for 
authority to serve new management of theaters it was 
already authorized to serve. 
B. Defendant's Common Motor ~arrier Application 
IV. 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT REGULARLY 
PURSUE ITS AUTHORITY BUT ACTED WITH-
OUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN GRANTING 
UNLIMITED COMMON CARRIER RIGHTS TO THE 
LESSEE OF A CONTRACT CARRIER PERMIT. 
The defendant Hill leased Contract Carrier Permit 
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No. 266 and other contract carrier rights in interstate 
commerce from ~Ielva H. Seamons on February 1, 1946. 
The lease was to expire in five years (Rec. I, 82), and 
as to intrastate rig·hts was approved by the Commis-
sion on April15, 1947. 
It is the contention of the plaintiff, Wycoff Com-
pany, Incorporated, that the Commission is a creature 
created by statute with limited powers. Nowhere has 
the Commission been granted the power to permit a 
lessee of contract carrier rights to make application in 
his own name for a certificate of convenience and ne,.. 
cessity as a common carrier, using as a basis his oper-
ations only as a lessee, and in violation of the terms 
of the lease on file with the Commission. 
A common carrier differs from a contract carrier 
in that it is a public utility, while a contract carrier is 
not. (76-5-15 U.C.A. 1943.) Hence the public, for whose 
protection the Commission was created, has a greater 
need to be protected when common carrier rights are 
granted than when contract carrier rights are granted. 
The much greater responsibility, then, rests upon the 
common carrier. 
There is much testimony which reflects confusion 
in the minds of the Commission, the lessee and the lessor. 
There are statements by them that the certificate, if 
granted, should issue in the name of the lessor; that 
the rights were to be granted to the lessor and to be 
operated by the lessee; that the lease covered the ( un-
mentioned) common carrier rights as well as the con-
tract carrier rights; that the lessee's interest in the 
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common carrier's rights, if granted, would pass to the 
lessor at the expiration of the lease on F·ebruary 1, 
1951. The order of the Commission gives the defendant 
Hill unlimited common carrier rights and makes no 
mention of the lease or of the lessor, Mrs. Seamons. It 
is to be remembered that the lease was terminable at 
will on thirty days' notice by the parties thereto. 
The plaintiff cannot find any authority or precedent 
for the lessee of a contract carrier rights to make ap. 
plication for common carrier rights in his own right 
soleiy on the basis of his services as a lessee of those 
rights, particularly when the terms of the lease ap~ 
prov.ed by the regulatory body forbid any rights be 
obtained except in the name of the lessor. 
It is true that Mrs. Seamons, the lessor, was pres-
ent at the hearing and appeared in behalf of the de-
fendant Hill; but her final statement on cross examina-
tion was that she wished the rights to be granted in her 
name, as follows : 
'' Q. May I ask her again whether or not it 
is her intention in appearing here that the rights 
be issued in her name, 
MR. HANSON (Attorney for defendant 
Hill): 
Well, now, that question ... 
"COMMISSIONER HACKING: She may 
answer "yes" or "no". 
"A. Yes." (Rec. I., 110). 
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v. 
THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO 
SUSTAIN THE FINDING THAT PUBLIC CON-
YE~IENCE A~D NECESSITY REQUIRES THAT 
THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK LINE BE AUTHOR-
IZED TO OPERATE AS A COMMON MOTOR CAR-
RIER. 
There is no substantial evidence to support the 
change of service from a contract carrier to common 
carrier ordered by the Commission. 
The Commission's report as to statements which 
are apparently intended to support the order of the 
Commission are as follows: 
"That for some time past, applicant has been 
operating under contract carrier permit No. 26'6 
and all supplements thereto, transporting motion 
picture films, theatre accessories magazines and 
periodicals from Salt Lake City to Lewiston and 
Garland, Utah, over U. S. 91, Utah 101, Utah 163, 
Utah 61, U. S. 191 and U.S. 30-S, serving the 
theatres of the various towns enroute from Salt 
Lake City to Lewiston and Garland, Utah. 
That the Seamons Truck Line has been con-
ducting continuous and satisfactory service as 
a contract carrier under the jurisdiction of this 
Commission, for the past 10 or 12 years. 
That the evidence submitted at said hearing 
establishes that public convenience and necessity 
requires that applicant be authorized to operate 
as a common motor carrier of: * * * '' (Rec. II, 15) 
-
It therefore appears that the Commission made no 
finding that the public desired or needed the change in 
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type of service, but ~:mly states that the defendant had 
rendered satisfactory service as a contract carrier for 
a number of years. (The defendant had been the ap-
proved lessee for a little more than two years, or since 
Apri115, 1947.) 
Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, sets forth the fol-
lowing requirements for issuance of certificates of con-
venience and necessity to common carriers and pro-
vides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any common motor 
carrier to operate as a carrier in intrastate com-
merce within this state without first having ob-
tained from the commission a certificate of con-
venience and necessity. * * * If the commission 
finds from the evidence that the public conven-
ience and necessity require the proposed service 
or any part thereof it may issue the certificate 
as prayed for, or issue it for the partial exercise 
only of the privilege sought * * *. Otherwise 
such certificate shall be denied.'' 
This court has construed this section in McCarthy, 
et al vs. Public Service Commission, et al (184 P. 2d 
220, 1947), which is a case very similar to the matter 
before the court. In it some contract carriers sought 
to change their services to common motor carriers, and 
after quoting Section 76-5-18, U.C.A., 1943, as set out 
above, Justice Pratt stated: 
''To comply with the above quoted provision 
the Public Service Commission must deny the 
carrier-defendant's applications for certificates 
of convenience and necessity unless presented 
with evidence from which it could find that there 
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is a public need for the services of a common car-
rier of sand and gravel, etc." (Ibid, 223) 
In this McCarthy case (supra) the plaintiff was the 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company. 
The defendants were eight trucking concerns which 
sought to change from contract to common carrier serv-
ice. The Public Service Commission issued them cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity to operate as com-
mon carriers of sand, gravel, cement, etc. The plaintiff 
railroad also possessed a certificate of convenience and 
necessity to operate as a common carrier of these com-
modities. There was a great deal of testimony showing 
the need for the services of the eight truckers. These 
aefendants, however, presented testimony at the hear-
ing that they had no intention of changing the way · 
they carried on their business. All the public witnesses 
whom these eight truckers served testified that they 
were satisfied with the service rendered. There was no 
evidence for a need to change from contract to com-
mon carrier service. 
The Court wrote three opinions in setting aside the 
orders of the Commission. Mr. Justice Wade wrote the 
only dissent. The majority opinions are in agreement 
that there must be evidence presented to the Commis-
sion of a need to change from contract to common car-
rier service before the Commission has p~wer to order 
such a ch~ange. 
The opinion of Mr. Justice Pratt on this subject 
states: 
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'' ... that despite the testimony of public wit. 
nesses offered in support of the sand and grave] 
truckers' applications there was no evidence of 
a need to change these contract carriers into com. 
mon carriers. (Ibid, 223) 
And, the opinion concluded that-
'' The legislature has distinguished between 
contract motor carriers and common motor car. 
riers. When there is evidence which tends to 
prove that the public need is for the service of 
a common carrier, then the commission under 
Sec. 76-518, UC.A, 1943 has the power to issue 
certificates of convenience and necessity and not 
until then. If the need is for contr,act carriers, 
that is not a foundation for action such as was 
taken by the commission in this case.'' (Italics 
ours). · 
The opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe concurred in 
the result reached by the court, and Mr~ ·Chief Justice 
McDonough concurred in his opinion which found there 1 
~ 
was no ·evidence that past services rendered as a con. 
tract carrier had not been adequate and that there was 
no evidence that the proposed common carrier services 
would enhance the public. 
''Indeed there is no evidence that the con. 
venience or necessity of the public to have sand, 
gravel and cement hauled will in any way be 
better served by common carriers' service than 
it has been in the past ten or twenty or more 
years by contract carrier service. * * * 
.As there is no sub~tantial evidence to sup· 
port the decision of the commission that public 
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convenience and necessity require the proposed 
services that decision must be set aside." (Ibid, 
224.) 
There is even less evidence in the case before the 
Court to support the finding of the Commission. The 
defendant Hill presented no public witnesses to support 
his application, and showed no need for changing his 
service from a contract carrier to a common carrier. 
The testimony of the defendant himself was to the 
effect that there was no need as far as the public was 
concerned for common carrier authority and that his 
sole reason was that, in his opinion, operating as a com-
mon carrier would be to his personal advantage. (Rec. 
I, 70-71). 
In line with previous decisions on the matter of 
public convenience and necessity, your Court will agree 
that it is no.t the mere convenience of the defendant-
applicant, but a genuine requirement that must be shown. 
(Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 101 Utah 245, 
117 P. 2d 298; O'Keefe v. Chicago Railways Co., 354 
ill. 645,188 N.E. 815. 
The plaintiff knows it is the duty of the Commis-
sion to hear the evidence and adduce certain determina-
tions and an order based upon the facts shown by such 
evidence. However, the Commission is a limited crea-
ture of law and may not arbitrarily substitute its own 
opinions, likes or dislikes for the evidence, or lack of 
it, produced at a ~earing of an application. ''Public 
convenience and necessity'' must be found, not private 
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advantage to an isolated carrier. It is, of course, im-
possible to bring in all of the public at a hearing of this 
kind, but the applicant at least has the duty to present 
to the Commission some representative witnesses from 
the public he proposes to serve to produce some sub-
stantial evidence to support his application. 
C. Plaintiff's Common Motor Carrier Application 
VI. 
THE FINDING OF THE COMMISSION THAT 
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY DOES 
NOT REQUIRE THE SERVICE PROPOSED TO BE 
RENDERED BY THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The public witness appearing in behalf of the ap-
plication of the Wycoff Company, Incorporated stated 
that he was the manager of one of the twelve or thirteen 
film distributing companies located in Salt Lake City 
which serve all of the motion picture theaters in Utah, 
Idaho, Montana, Wyoming and Nevada. (Rec. I, 124). 
When asked whether it was true that the distributors 
in Salt Lake all operate on substantially the same basis 
he stated that they did and that he was familiar with all 
of them (Rec. I, 131). 
His testimony follows: 
'' Q. Now, I ask you whether or not there 
are occasions when you need the service of more 
than one carrier into this north area? 
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• ·A. Yes: that has con1e up many a time, 
due to the fact that "'\Yvroff I believe runs two 
or three trips a day out· of here and Roy (Hill) I 
believe operates one trip a day out of here. 
'· Q. X ow, have yon had in emergencies had 
to call upon "'\Yyroff to haul film for you? 
• · ~-\... Several times; and we are very thank-
ful we are able to call on him. Because if we 
didn't have the service we would have missed 
the theatre out entirely on their business. 
"Q. That sen~ce has been rendered gratui-
tously, has it? 
'• ~-\... Strictly gratuitous; no charge to us, no 
charge to the exhibitor." (Rec. I, 126). 
~Ir. McMahon also testified that emergencies occur 
in the film industry at irregular intervals varying from 
two or three days in a row to a month or more (Rec. 
I, 127), which requires an extra motor carrier service. 
The testimony of ~L S. Wycoff is that these emer-
gencies requiring additional service into the contem-
plated area is more than once a week. (Rec. I, 136) 
This is the type of service contemplated by the applica-
tion of plaintiff to serve the public as a common motor 
carrier. 
(Testimony of M. S. Wycoff, president of plaintiff 
company): 
'' Q. Now is it your desire to continue to de-
liver gratuitously in these emergencies, or do 
you think that you should be authorized so you 
can charge for it? 
"A. We think that it has grown into such 
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proportions now that we should be comp.ensated 
for it. 
'' Q. Do you feel there is a need for this addi-
tional service¥ 
A. There certainly is." (Rec. I, 136, 137). 
''Commissioner Hacking: * * Assume for the 
purpose of my question that the Commission 
should grant you your common carrier applica-
tion and also Roy Hill's application. 
"A. Well, that would be entirely-
''Commissioner Hacking: Then, how would 
this business of getting film be handled¥ 
"A. Roy (Hill), in my opinion, would con-
tinue to handle the bulk of the film up there, 
probably all of it." (Rec. I, 168) 
It is clearly the intention of the plaintiff to render 
a service that the public needs and wants, and to be 
compensated for it instead of being forced to render it 
gratuitously in order to comply with the law. This 
type of service requires common motor carrier authority 
because the plaintiff has no possible way to choose 
whom it will serve in cases of emergency, as a contract 
carrier must do, and the public convenience and neces-
sity requires that additional service should be available. 
The fact that one representative of the film distri-
buting companies testified on cross-examination that 
the defendant Hill had never refused to make a special 
trip for that witness (Rec. I, 132, 133) is not substantial 
evidence on which to base the finding of the Commission, 
because he had already indicated that the gratuitous 
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emergency seiTices of the plaintiff had been used in 
times of need when the defendant could not render the 
service. (Previous testimony of Mr. McMahon, set 
forth above). 
VII. 
THE FI~DIXGS OF THE CO~IMISSION THAT 
THERE IS ALREADY SUFFICIENT SERVICE 
AVAIL~WLE A~D THAT THE GRANTING OF A 
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECES-
SITY TO PLAINTIFF WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL 
TO EXISTIXG TR~iNSPORTATION SERVICE AND 
CONTRARY TO THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
PEOPLE I~ THE AREA, ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTAXTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that plaintiff desires 
authority only to serve the public in times of emergency 
when other carriers, because of limited schedules and 
equipment, are physically unable to serve the public. 
The effect of a "dark house" (i.e., a theatre without 
motion picture film to show the public) is disastrous 
both to the distributor of the film which is presented 
with a claim for damages (Rec. I, 126, 127), and to the 
theater itself which loses the good will of the community 
it serves. The only public witness testified that there 
was need of additional service by the plaintiff, that the 
present service was not always adequate, and stated 
that the plaintiff had several times saved his company 
and the public from having a ''dark house.'' (Rec. I, 
126). 
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The plaintiff is already operating the necessary 
equipment needed to serve the proposed area through 
these communities in interstate commerce, transporting 
motion picture films and related commodities, and also 
in intrastate commerce, carrying other commodities as 
a common carrier. This limited service proposed by the 
plaintiff will be beneficial to everyone concerned - to 
the defendant Hill whose limited equipment (2 trucks) 
(Rec. II, 4) will not enable him to make special trips 
when they are required by the industry; to the plaintiff 
who should be compensated for its frequent hauls into 
this area in times of emergency; and most of all, to the 
public, for whose protection the Commission was estab-
lished. 
The Commission has adequate power to issue such 
a limited certificate of convenience and necessity to 
render service in times of emergency, etc. to adequately 
protect ''existing transportation facilities'' and to foster 
"the best interests of the people in the area" to be 
served. The legislature gave the Commission ample 
power and latitude to cope with this situation, as fol-
lows: 
''If the commission finds from the evidence 
that the public convenience and necessity require 
the proposed service or any part thereof it may 
issue the certificate as prayed for, or issue it for 
the partial exercise only of the privilege sought, 
and may attach to the exercise of the right 
granted by such certificate such terms and condi-
tions as in its judgment the public convenience 
and necessity may require, otherwise such cer-
tificate shall be denied." (76-5-18, UCA 1943). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
CONCLUSION 
The Public SeiTice Commission has acted impro-
vidently in these cases by withholding the benefits of a 
statutory contract carrier permit after granting the 
plaintiff, \Yycoff Company, Incorporated such a permit 
to ·serve the theatres in the Tremonton-Garland area. 
The Commission has also made findings regarding pub-
lic convenience and necessity which are not supported 
by substantial evidence as is required by our law. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits, therefore, that the 
Court should enter its order directing that the Public 
Service Commission of Utah grant to the plaintiff the 
authority requested for service as a contract motor 
carrier to the points in Tremonton and Garland, and 
authority to establish emergency service proposed by 
plaintiff's application for common carrier authority. 
In addition plaintiff ·submits that the Court should 
reverse the action of the Commisions in Case No. 3273 
wherein common motor carrier service was authorized, 
and direct that the Commission enter an order denying 
such authority to the defendant Roy Hill. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WAYNE C. DURHAM, 
215 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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